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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a proceeding under the Utah Declara-
tory Judgment Act. Plaintiff prayed that the Court 
declare the correlative rights and duties of ( 1) the 
developer of a mountain-home subdivision and (2) 
an association of lot owners within the subdivision 
under the circumstances revealed by the evidence. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Trial Court declared the rights and 
duties of the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The total tract of land to which this action 
relates is delineated on Exhibit 1-P. It consists 
of 320 acres (E 1/2, Sec. 27, T 1 N, R 7 E, SLM) 
of which some 100 acres, shown in red hatching 
on Exhibit 1-P, had (at the times relevant to this 
suit) been made the subject of subdivision plats 
filed with and approved by the Summit County 
Commission. The approved plats are in evidence 
as Exhibits 31-P and 32-P. At the time of 
Respondent's incorporation, September 12, 1962, 
-2-
(Exhibit 9-D). no land except that within the red 
hatching on Exhibit 1-P could legally be sold or 
properly referred to as "Aspen Acres". So far as 
the record shows, no part of the blue hatched area 
on Exhibit 1-P has ever been the subject of any 
subdivision plat. For purposes of easy reference, 
the total half section will be called the "Tract", the 
subdivided (red-hatched) portion of the Tract will 
be called "Aspen Acres", and the unsubdivided 
(blue-hatched) portion of the Tract will be called 
the "Remainder". 
The Tract was acquired at some time prior 
to 1962 by Aspen Acres Inc. , the "Developer". 
Many of the lots in Aspen Acres were sold by the 
summer of 1962, and the usual problems associated 
with resort communities began to arise. Who would 
assure adequate water for the homes, who would 
-3-
as sure adequate road systems, who would pro-
vide garbage disposal, who would provide pro-
tection from theives and vandals? (Exhibit 3-P) 
In August of 1962, Max Bateman, the 
Developer's President, called a meeting of lot 
owners to induce their formation of a lot owners 
association. The Developer's lawyer had prepared., 
Articles (R-212) and addressed the lot owners on 
the importance of their associating. Basically, 
the Developer's message was that it wanted to 
be relieved of responsibility for water and road 
system maintenance, and, if the lot owners would 
form an association and assumes these responsibi 
ties, the Developer would convey to the as sociatic 
the rights necessary to adequate performance. 
The witness who most clearly remembered the 
Developer's presentation at the organizational 
meeting was Paul Carpenter. His 
-4-
testimony in that regard begins at R-211 and con-
tinues for several pages. The gist of his account 
of the Developer 1 s statement is contained in this 
quote from R-211-12: 
"he was now divorcing himself 
from those responsibilities, and 
he was turning the whole thing 
over to the association, for which 
they would be responsible, and 
along with which they would have 
the rights, the powers, and 
authorities to do what was neces-
sary." 
From the time of its formation, Respondent 
assumed the total obligation for water and road 
maintenance (Exhibit 2-P, R-216 et seq.) within 
Aspen Acres. To some degree, the nature of the 
rights conveyed or intended to be conveyed was 
expressed in written instruments. For example, 
the Developer conveyed water rights by deed 
(Exhibit 13-P). In March of 1963, Appellant ac-
-5-
' quired the Remainder from the Developer (Exhibit 
16-P). In May of 1963, the parties entered into an 
agreement (Exhibit 15-P) by which Appellant agreed 
to convey to Respondent all the "water rights and 
water system including tanks and equipment and 
rights -of-ways pertaining thereto" as soon as 
Appellant acquired them in consideration of Appellant1s 
I 
assumption of "full responsibility in connection with 
the maintenance, development and operation of such 
water system (paragraph 6). 
Appellant now denies execution of Exhibit 
15-P, but the conduct of the parties from the 
date of apparent execution has been entirely 
consistent with the language of the written instru-
ment. Respondent has maintained the system and 
has entered upon the Remainder to service the 
system as if it had easements to do so. There has 
-6-
been no Appellant objection (R-217). 
Finally, with regard to control of access 
from the highway across the South portion of the 
Remainder to Aspen Acres, there was no 
Appellant-executed, written instrument estab-
lishing the Association's right to maintain a 
gate at the point of departure of the access road from 
the highway. Nevertheless, immediately after the 
Association was formed (Exhibit 9-D, Minutes of 
September 2, 1962) its directors appointed a 
committee to promulgate ground rules. Mr. 
Carpenter was the Chairman of the Ground Rules 
Committee (ibid) and the rules his Committee 
formulated were adopted by the directors (meeting 
of October 30, 1962, Exhibit 9-D). The Ground 
Rules themselves are found in the "by-laws" Section 
of Exhibit 9-D. Rule 18 provides for a gate to con-
-7-
trol access. The rules were a primary subject 
for discussion at a general membership meeting 
of September 26, 1962. Max Bateman, the 
Developer's President was present. The rules 
were "unanimously approved" by the membership 
(Exhibit 9-D). 
By October 29, 1964, (Minutes of that date, 
Exhibit 9-D) the gate was installed, and its 
operation was discussed at a general membership 
meeting of May 5, 1965, (Exhibit 9-D). At no 
time did the Developer make oral or written 
objection to the Association's control of access 
even though represented at the meetings when the 
rules were adopted and constructively present 
when the claimed right to control was exercised. 
It was not until Appellant assumed the Developer's 
position that the lock was sawed off and the gate 
-8-
itself was repeatedly rammed (R-224). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
HELD THAT RESPONDENT OWNS THE 
WATER SYSTEM AND EASEMENTS 
FOR ITS MAINTENANCE 
Appellant, at page 10 of its brief, denies 
that any witness recalled a promise by the Developer 
to convey the water system to Respondent. Mr. 
Carpenter, however, testified that the Developer's 
counsel represented, in the context of a discussion 
about road and water systems, that the Developer 
was "turning the whole thing over" to the Association 
which would have the "rights, powers and .authorities" 
to carry out its responsibilities of maintenance. 
Thereafter, we have conduct over a period 
of almost a decade consistent only with an under-
-9-
II 
standing that Respondent could exercise completel 
I 
dominion over the pipes, tanks and other compon~ 
of the sys tern. 
Respondent need not rely on an oral contr1 
or on the implications of its continuing exercise o!.: 
dominion over the system without objection. The~ 
I 
a written instrument, fully executed by both partii 
which clearly states Appellant's obligation to convj 
I 
i 
the system to Respondent. Appellant argues thatll 
the contract was not delivered by Appellant to 
Respondent, (2) the authority to execute the argurnl 
is not revealed by the Minutes of either party, (3) 
Appellant's conduct after May 22, 1967, is inconsis 
tent with its claim that the contract was in effect, 
and (4) Appellant is estopped to assert the contra~ 
We will consider these points in the order Appellam 
makes them. 
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(1) There was delivery. 
Exhibit 15 is not a deed but a contract 
containing a promise to convey in the future. 
Delivery is not, therefore, a concept that has 
real application. Nevertheless, Appellant pro-
duced the instrument which was in Appellant's 
possession. It must, therefore, have been 
delivered. Significantly, it was signed on the 
date of one of Respondent's membership meetings 
which both signators of the contract attended. 
(2) Respondent can rely on the signature. 
Appellant admits that Exhibit 13-P was 
signed on behalf of Appellant by Walton R. Farmer 
(Appellant's brief, page 15). Mr. Farmer was, 
at the time he affixed his signature, an officer and 
director of Appellant (Exhibit 25-D) who dealt 
for Appellant with Respondent (membership meeting 
of May 22, 1963, Exhibits 29-P, 30-P). Against 
-11-
that background of apparent authority of Farmer to 
act for Appellant, Appellant cannot now deny Farmer1, 
authority. In this connection, we cite 19 Am Jur 
2d 590, Corporations Section 1164: 
"The fundamental and well-
settled rule is that when, in the usual 
course of the business of a corpora-
tion, an officer or other agent is held 
out by the corporation or has been 
permitted to act for it or manage its af-
fairs in such a way as to justify third 
persons who deal with him in inferring 
or assuming that he is doing an act or 
making a contract within the scope of 
his authority, the corporation is bound 
thereby, even though such officer or 
agent has not the actual authority from 
the corporation to do such an act or 
make such a contract. " 
Appellant's argument that, even if Farmer 
signed the contract, he meant to keep the fact of its 
execution secret but inadvertantly placed the executed 
contract on the top of his car from which it was blown 




The witnesses merely speculated that this might 
have happened; the instrument in evidence does not 
appear to have been damaged by the elements; and 
the record clearly shows that, on the date the 
instrument bears, both signators were attending a 
general membership meeting of Respondent's 
members at the Utah Power & Light auditorium in 
Salt Lake. It is obvious that the instrument was 
signed at that meeting. In any event, with the fully 
executed agreement in evidence and produced by 
Respondent, the Trial Court was not obliged to 
believe it was not intended to be executed and 
delivered. This is particularly true when there 
is ( 1) such a clear trial of Minutes regarding this 
.. 
contract in Respondent's records right up to May 20, 
1963, when a special re solution authorizing this contract 
d and ( 2) a m inute entry that, at the May was passe , 
-13-
22, 1963, meeting (the date of the contract), Mr. 
Farmer told the members that "after they had 
paid off their obligation to Mr. Bateman, they 
would give the Association clear deeds and titles 
to roads, water storage tanks, equipment and 
lines in which they have any interest. 11 Clearly, 
Mr. Farmer was telling the members about the 
content of a contract he had just signed. The 
very authority Appellant cites ( 17 C. J. S. , Contract1 
Section 64) for the proposition that delivery is 
an essential element of contract notes that "delivery 
may be actual or constructive, 11 and "a writing 
not delivered may be evidence of the actual terms 
of an agreement between parties. " 
(3) Respondent's failure to produce Exhibit, 
15-P before trial does not require its being 
excluded from evidence. 
-14-
On July 22, 1971, some two months 
before the trial, Respondent answered interro-
gatories in a manner which establishes that 
Respondent's then president either (a) did not 
know of the existence of the agreement which 
was introduced as Exhibit 15-P or (b) was not 
aware that paragraph 6 of that agreement bore 
directly on the is sues in the suit. 
It must be admitted that, in the prepara-
tion for trial, all the documents in Respondent's 
files were scrutinized more carefully than they 
were for purposes of responding to interroga-
tories. Exhibit 15-P must be read fully and 
carefully before its relevance is recognized. In 
any event, the facts about the late discovery of 
the document or its relevance were revealed to 
the trial judge before trial commenced, and the 
-15-
document can hardly have surprised Appellant; 
it bore the signatures of two of Appellant's 
officers or ex-officers. 
Appellant has called this Court's attention\, 
to three cases and one text which support the 
proposition that a trial judge is justified in 
drawing inferences from the failure of a party to 
produce a witness to refute adverse testimony whe~ 
the witness is in that party's control. None of the 
authorities would impose upon any Court an 
obligation totally to discredit evidence as relevant 
as Exhibit 15-P merely because the party seeking 
to introduce it could not explain the circumstances 
of its execution and delivery. 
In the instant case, of course, it is simply 
not true that Resporrlent could produce witnesses 
who could testify about how Exhibit 15-P came to 
-16-
be in Respondent's possession. The two people 
who signed it were among the founders of the 
Appellant corporation, and both were adverse 
witnesses. What the record does show is that 
(a) the Exhibit was in Respondent's possession 
at the time of trial, (b) the signatures are 
entirely authentic, (c) Respondent's Minutes 
are laden with authority for its execution, (d) 
Appellant's Minutes show no action between 
May 8, 1963, and September 3, 1963, but 
Appellant's witness, Kenneth Stahr, testified 
(R-265) that Exhibit 15-P was "prepared by 
Mr. Farmer" acting for Appellant, and (e) 
Appellant's Minutes do not show any official 
corporate consideration and rejection of the 
argument. 
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(4) The state of the two sets of corporate 
Minutes and other records does not justify or 
require a conclusion that Exhibit 15-P is not valid 
and enforceable. 
Appellant has devoted appreciable space 
in its brief to comment on the absence of Minute 
entry authority for the execution of Exhibit 15-P. 
With regard to Respondent, of course, there is a 
special resolution, dated May 20, 1963, covering 
the terms of the agreement. Appellant's Minutes 
are entirely sitent on the subject, even though Mr. 
Stahr testified that some form of agreement was 
formally discussed by Appellant's directors on 
May 8. At some time, Mr. Stahr made a hand-
written notation on Exhibit 17 that Appellant's 
directors had rejected Respondent's proposal as 
framed on May 8; there is no notation or Minute 
-18-
entry anywhere, however, to the effect that 
Respondent's proposal as framed on May 20 was 
rejected. The evidence of Appellant's witnesses 
is, in fact, that Mr. Farmer acting for Appellant 
prepared the agreement which was signed and that 
both signatures on the document are authentic. 
The mere fact that a Minute entry 
authorizing Mr. Farmer to sign Exhibit 15-P for 
Appellant cannot be located does not invalidate 
the contract. It is obvious that Appellant's 
records are incomplete; there are no Minutes 
of the May 8, 1963, meeting, for example. 
Moreover, Appellant did not always act by cor-
porate resolution in making contracts. There 
is not, so far as we can determine, even a 
corporate resolution authorizing Appellant's 
purchase of the Remainder from the Developer. 
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The law applicable to the situation is, 
even if the agreement were oral, adequately 
stated in the following excerpts from Sections 
960 and 961 of the American Jurisprudence 
Treatise on Corporations { 19 Am Jur 2d 438, 4J~ 
"Generally speaking, the assent 
of the directors of a corporation is 
necessary to validate a corporate act, 
but it is not always essential to action 
by the corporation that it be in pursuance 
of a formal resolution of the board of 
directors, since corporations, as well 
as individuals, may be bound by impli-
cation." 
"The acts of a corporation, in 
other respects rightfully transacted, 
a re not invalid because not reduced to 
writing, unless a statute makes such 
writing indispensable as evidence or to 
give the acts an obligatory force. Except 
where otherwise required by statute, a 
corporation may enter into parol con-
tracts and engagements the same as an 
individual. Thus, a corporate agent 
may be appointed by parol. It has also 
been held that a transfer of the assets, 
good will, and property of a corporation 
may be effectually made by parol, where 
-20-
a writing is not expressly required 
by statute. Indeed, even though the 
statute provides that the corporation 
shall contract only in writing, no 
matter how positive or peremptory 
the language may be, it does not 
avoid an executed contract of which 
the corporation has received the 
benefit. Moreover, the acts of cor-
porations are presumed to be regular 
until the contrary appears. Further-
more, although the corporation has 
failed to comply with some formality 
or regulation which it should not have 
neglected, but which has in fact been 
omitted after both parties to the 
transaction have acted and proceeded 
as if all preliminary formalities and 
regulations had been complied with, 
and rights have attached, the corporation 
itself cannot be heard to set up the 
informality. 11 
(5} Respondent's conduct has not been in-
consistent with its claim that an agreement em-
bodying essentially the terms of Exhibit 15-P 
was in effect between the parties. 
-21-
It should be remembered that this litiga-
tion was not commenced as an effort to enforce 
Exhibit 15-P. The Complaint asks the Court to 
declare the rights of the parties 1 under a set of 
circumstances of which the execution of the 
agreement is only one. At the time the Complaint 
was filed, Respondent was obviously unaware 
that the promise to convey the water system had 
been reduced to writing. No mention of the contra1 
was made in the Complaint. Basically, RespondeD 
alleges that its members assumed responsibility 
for maintenance of road and water systems in 
consideration of the Developer's promise to "turn 
over" those systems and clothe Respondent with 
adequate authority to as sure road and water 
service to Aspen Acres lot owners. 




is inconsistent with its claim that the Developer 
(and Appellant as successor to the Developer) 
has the obligation to keep its promise. That 
promise is the same whether written or oral 
' 
express or implied. The Trial Court simply 
declared that the promise was made and is 
enforceable. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
DECLARED THAT RESPONDENT HAD 
THE RIGHT TO CONTROL ACCESS 
TO ASPEN ACRES FROM 
THE HIGHWAY 
Without question, on the evidence, Res-
pondent has since 1963, assumed the responsibility 
for the maintenance of the means of access from 
the public highway across the South portion of 
the Remainder to Aspen Acres. The Trial Court 
recognized an easement in favor of the lot owners 
-23-
along that access route and, with regard to 
that easement, declared that Respondent, as 
trustee for Aspen Acres lot owners, has the 
right to exercise reasonable controls over the 
use oi the road. 
The evidence on the subject is, of 
course, that, immediately after the formal 
proceedings which culminated in the formation 
of Respondent and during which the Developer 
made certain promises about the rights 
Respondent would be afforded, Respondent 
prepared "ground rules" including those 
which involved control of use of the access road. 
These rules were unanimously approved at 
a general membership meeting attended by the 
Developer. Thereafter, without objection from 
the Developer, a gate was installed at the highway. 
-24-
Shortly after Appellant succeeded to the 
Developer's interest, we have the lock being 
sawed off, the gate being rammed, and the 
right of control asserted by Appellant being 
violated or denied. Respondent attempted to 
negotiate a resolution of the problem and, 
when negotiations failed, sought a Judicial 
declaration of rights. 
The Trial Court concluded that this 
right of reasonable control (over the roadway 
Respondent was obligated to maintain) was 
(a) specifically promised as a part of the 
consideration for Respondent's assumption 
of the maintenance responsibility or (b) 
established as a facet of Respondent's role 
by the conduct of the parties, or (c) implied 
by the circumstances as necessary for 
-25-
Respondent's effective performance of its 
obligations. 
It is clearly the law that, where an 
easement is expressly or impliedly granted 
and the particulars of the easement are not 
stated, the location, extent, and manner of 
use are established by the conduct of the 
parties. This point of law should require 
no extensive citation of authorities. We would 
refer the Court, however, to 25 Arn Jur 2d, 
474 to 480, Easements, Section 67, 73 and 74. 
The conduct of the parties (i.e. , the Developer 
and Respondent) in this case, until Appellant 
succeeded to the Developer's position, 
established the location, extent, and manner 
of use to be exactly what the Trial Court de-
clared them to be. 
-26-
Appellant suggests, at page 26 of its 
brief, that Max Bateman was not really acting for 
the Developer in his intercourse with Respondent 
and its founders. The record will not support any 
such speculation. The lot owners dealt with Max 
Bateman as the Developer's president, the same 
capacity in which he acted when he sold them their 
lots. In this connection, we call the Court's 
attention to Section 6-E-5 of Summit County 
Ordinance 58 ( 1967) which requires the subdivider 
to cause a lot owners association to be formed. 
It was obviously as the subdivider that Mr. 
Bateman was acting; he was providing for 
the performance of a subdivider's promise and, 
in fact, doing what the law now requires sub-
dividers to do. 
Appellant next suggests that Respondent 
-27-
is some kind of volunteer, representing a 
minority of lot owners and without status to 
assert any rights on behalf of lot owners as 
a class. In that regard, the Trial Court 
concluded that associations like Re3pondent 
are absolutely necessary if owners of lots 
within a subdivision like Aspen Acres are 
to realize any real benefits from ownership. It 
is always true that some lot owners will avoid 
contributing to the costs of providing services 
if they can enjoy those services without paying. 
Thil? fact is, however, that this Association 
does represent many lot owners and has --- --
assumed the total responsibility for road and 
water system maintenance since 1963 under 
contract with the Developer. Associations 
like Respondent~ not without status and are 
-28-
not anomolies. Section 6-E-5 of Summit 
County Ordinance 58, to which we have here-
tofore referred, reads in part as follows: 
a. As assurance of main-
tenance of the common open space 
and other improvements where so 
required the subdivider shall cause 
to be formed, prior to the recording of 
the final plat, a Lot Owners Asso-
ciation and shall establish articles of 
incorporation of the Association, by-
laws and covenants outlining the 
purpose, organization and operation 
of the Association. 
b. Such articles of incorpor-
ation and covenants shall, among other 
things, provide: 
1. That membership shall be 
mandatory for each lot 
purchaser and any successive 
buyer. 
2. That Common Open Space 
restrictions must be per-
manent, not just for a 




That the Association must 
be responsible for liability 
insurance, local taxes and I 
the maintenance of recreation.! 
al and other facilities. I 
That lot owners must pay 
their pro rata share of the 
costs. 
5. That the assessment levied 
by the Association shall be-
come a lien against the pro-
perty. 
6. That the Association must 
be able to adjust the assess-
ment to meet changed needs. 
We cannot conceive that this Court will find an 
association formed as this Ordinance contemplate! 
to be without authority to act for lot owners. 
Obviously, if the majority of lot owners 
want all controls lifted from the use of the access 
road, if they want motorcycles and snowmobiles 
using their lots freely, if they want the public to 
-30-
enjoy the subdivision's common area, if they 
enjoy seeing cars parked on the bridge and 
blocking the access, if they feel that thieves 
should have an easy way of getting to and 
from subdivision homes, then those lot owners 
can join the Association. Their will must 
become the corporate will. In the circum-
stances, however, we submit that the 
Judiciary should not waste sympathy on lot 
.owners who will not pay for road and water 
maintenance and insist on practices which in-
crease the costs of such maintenance. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN REFUSING TO DECLARE A 
RIGHT IN APPELLANT TO USE 
SUBDIVISION ROADS FREELY 
The nature of the easement in roads 
within the subdivision is set forth very speci-
-31-
fically in the deeds by which the Developer 
has sold Aspen Acres' lots. The Trial Court 
construed the language, and Appellant presents 
no compelling reason for a different construc-
tion. It is obvious that the Developer's use 
of subdivision roads for the purpose of moving 
heavy equipment onto the Remainder imposes 
a burden well beyond what was contemplated by 
the lot owners when they bought or Respondent 
when it assumed the burdens of road mainten-
ance. 
Appellant argues for an easement of 
necessity. It is not clear from Exhibit 1-P 
that Appellant does not have a means of access 
to the North part of the Remainder along the 
West boundary of the Tract. In any event, 
"way of necessity" concept has never been 
-32-
applied to reserve to a subdivider an easement 
in all the roads of a subdivision. If the concept 
has any application at all, the implied way 
should be along the West route which involves 
the least disruption within Aspen Acres. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL GOUR T DID NOT 
ERR IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT 
ASSUMED THE DEVELOPER'S 
OBLIGATIONS 
The contract by which Appellant acquired 
the Remainder is in evidence as Exhibit 16-P. 
It is clear from that contract that Appellant 
knew of the existence of Aspen Acres Subdivision 
and was acquiring, besides the Remainder, "all 
of the right, title and interest of the seller or 
Ma:X Bateman in Aspen Acres. " The Trial 
Court concluded that the obligations of a sub-
-33-
divider pass with the land when the subdivision 
is sold. We submit that no other conclusion 
which accords with popular understanding and 
general practice is possible. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant case presents issues 
which will undoubtedly recur as Utah 1 s mountain 
resort areas are developed. Associations of 
lot owners are the only practical means by 
which assurance of good water and access can 
be provided. In this case, Respondent asked for 
a declaration of its rights under circumstances 
which have been exhaustively explored. 
The Trial Court has, in our view, in-
-34-
corporated sensible, practical and legally 
supportable guidelines in its Findings, Con-
clusions and Judgment. The judgment 
should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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